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Border / Frontier Cities: Between Communication and 
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Abstract. The globalisation phenomenon led to the relaxation of borders all over 
the world. But, at the same time it generated the appearance of invisible frontiers which 
may create deeper fragmentations inside the society. Apart from the national states, the 
cities are also markers of identity and places where the ethnic, religious, social, economic 
differences are more sensible. The present article tackles the issue of frontier / border 
cities in order to highlight the differences between them and to analyse how the border / 
frontier affect their development. 
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Introduction 
Although we live in a globalised world, thus an interconnected and even frontier 
less society, borders are now more important than ever. They stand as geographical, 
physical delimitations between two national states or two international identities (for 
example the frontier between Romania and the Republic of Moldova is also the frontier 
between the EU and Moldova). They are also identity markers, since within the borders 
we can speak about different identities that separate the ones from inside from the ones 
from outside. One example in this sense can be the Ukrainian crisis which once again 
emphasised the delimitation between the East and the West or between the EUropeans and 
non-EUropeans. Once it erupted, it put pressure on the securitisation of the EU’s and 
NATO’s external frontiers that were preoccupied for the national security of their member 
states. Another example in the case of the EU’s external borders is the current migrants’ 
crisis from the Middle East, especially Syria that search for asylum in the EU. Given the 
aforementioned examples, the EU was more than once accused of being a fortress that 
develops visible and invisible fences for the non-EU citizens. Nowadays, the regional 
dynamics reached a critical point and the migrants are putting the EU in face of a crucial 
option in which its member states have to decide their immediate and medium strategies 
regarding the thousands of migrants’ families that try to enter its borders. This decision is 
even more difficult to take taking into consideration the EU’s image as a normative power 
that fights for human rights protection. At the same time, the organisation comes with 
another challenge, the one of internal frontiers that created different identities even from 
within
3
. On one hand, we have the traditional national borders that delimit the national 
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sovereignty of a member state, and one the other, there is the Euro zone’s frontier that 
separates the countries that use the Euro as their currency from the others that did not 
adopt the euro yet by choice or by objective, economical and procedural reasons. The EU 
also presents itself with the Schengen area, a region in which the national control borders 
are lifted. To all these over layered identities, the national states confront themselves with 
their internal frontiers / limits which are caused by multiple reasons like: economic 
disparities, social exclusion / inclusion, and ethnic characteristics. Last, but not least, we 
cannot exclude form this analysis the Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty which clearly 
stipulates the competences of the Member states to which the EU is not interfering. 
Among them the national security, the local and the regional self-government remain in 
the sole exclusive responsibility of the Member states, adding a new layer to the 
aforementioned identities
4
. 
To these national and organisational borders / frontiers, there can be added the 
transversal ones, which go beyond the national jurisdiction
5
. An example in this sense 
could be the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights which is 
administered by the World Trade Organization and it allows certain professionals to move 
beyond the national borders. But this liberty creates a new frontier which is even harder to 
be penetrated than the actual fences from certain national borders because for example 
poor migrants or the asylum seekers do not benefit from this opportunity, creating thus a 
separation line between the first group and the last
6
. This is also the case of the current 
migrant crisis that cannot enter the EU who are clearly separated from the professionals 
that are coming from the Middle East into Europe. 
The present article will tackle the issue of borders / frontiers in the European 
continent, making references and analysing different meanings of the two concepts both 
internally and externally.  The importance of the subject lays in the fact that the existence 
of borders / frontiers generates a different even an antagonistic position between us and 
them, fact that within a state and more importantly, within a city creates divisions that 
affects the social, economic and political development and stability of that particular city. 
The frontier cities present themselves with the characteristic of the states in which they are 
located, but also some of the ones that are present beyond the state’s national borders. 
 
Borders and frontiers 
According to the common meaning, the border and the frontier are two concepts 
which are often confused in different languages around the globe. For example in English 
the terms are “frontier, boundary, borderland, limit; in French they are la frontière, la 
limite, fins and confins; in Italian la frontiera, il confine, termini; in Spanish la frontera, el 
limite, el confin; in German die Mark, die Grenze (and the derivatives Grenzgebiet, 
Grenzraum); in Slavic (e.g. Polish) granica (‘border’) and pogranicze (‘borderland’), 
miedza (‘baulk’, absorbed into Hungarian as megye), rubie¿ (‘frontier’), kresy (‘ends, 
distant extent’), formerly also kraina (East-Slavic ukraj, ukraina, ‘land on the outskirts, on 
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the edge’)” and in Romanian graniţă (border), frontier (frontier)7. All of them suggest the 
existence of a limit, of a demarcation point between x and y, but do not make the 
difference between border and frontier. 
Although the concept of border makes more reference towards the geographical 
point of view and indicates the separation for security reasons and not only, since the 
Roman Empire it also implied the need for further cooperation or communication with the 
exterior: “Along history the borders didn't stop individuals and societies to communicate, 
communication didn't stop at the border, it was more a threshold where communication 
took place at a lower level. Inside and outside the borders there were different group 
identities which changed in size over time, changed their mentalities, their image about 
one another, while communicating
8”. This need was accelerated over time given the 
complex interdependences that emerged between neighbouring states, especially since 
they developed what Barry Buzan called a regional security complex, a situation in which 
the security of one unit cannot be separated by the security of another
9
. 
While the concept of border is generally used to highlight the geographical 
borders, the concept of frontier refers to other kinds of delimitation, such as the ethnic, 
political, religious, social ones. In order to highlight the difference between the two, 
during this study, we will analyse different cities from Europe, EU and non-EU ones. 
The choice of analysing cities and not states is not by accident, since in our view 
they represent a new frontier zone, in which they have to deal with the internal conflicts, 
diversity and international vulnerabilities. Along history they had to tackle these issues 
and to become an integrated and functional city, so that they started to transform the actual 
military conflicts into opportunities of commerce and dialogue
10
. Examples in this sense 
can be the border cities, which must continue to be operational, although at inter-state 
level there are some diplomatic, political tensions (the Romania border city of Oradea and 
the Hungarian one of Debrecen
11
, that continue to have interactions despite the current 
diplomatic tension between Romania and Hungary
12
). 
From an economic point of view, “these cities, whether in the global north or 
south have become a strategic frontier zone for global corporate capital. Much of the work 
of forcing deregulation, privatization, and new fiscal and monetary policies on the host 
governments had to do with creating the formal instruments to construct their equivalent 
of the old military “fort” of the historic frontier: the regulatory environment they need in 
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city after city worldwide to ensure a global space of operations.”13 Additionally these 
cities come with other frontiers from an economic point of view, like the custom control 
that checks the goods which are entering the respective city if they are not part of 
Schengen area or other likewise agreement. 
From an identity point of view, large cities tend to create rather local identities, 
which may or may not diminish the ethnical tensions, especially in relation with other 
large cities. In general this is the case of capitals, since they encompass a large diversity of 
ethnic identities. At the same time, these cities, being at the median way between the 
national level and the local level, not so big as a country or as a region, but not so small as 
a medium and small city, represent an opportunity for the disadvantaged part of the 
population, since they “have also become a strategic frontier zone for those who lack 
power, those who are disadvantaged, outsiders, discriminated minorities”14. 
At the other side, there will be analysed the border cities, the cities that are at the 
borderline between two states. Regarding these cities, there must be said, that unlike the 
frontier cities that create / present / develop invisible frontiers, nowadays the border cities 
tend to transform the geographical delimitation into an opportunity of cross-border 
cooperation. But this is a positive result if the regional setting is characterised by a high 
level of security and predictability. In this situation the neighbouring states does not 
necessarily cooperate with each other, but at the same time they do not form a regional 
security complex characterised by an enmity. An example in this sense could be the 
European Union member states and their border regions / cities. On the other side, we can 
witness a regional setting like the one between Afghanistan and Pakistan or the Middle 
East region especially Israel-Iran.  Where in the first case we can discuss about the border 
city as a triggering factor for deeper cooperation and a space of diversity in the second one 
the border city represents vulnerability for the security of a state. At the same time given 
the low level of security, in the second case, the border cities are limited in their actions, 
since they do not attract investors (foreign or national) fact that has a negative effect over 
the local economy and thus under a spill over effect affects the social setting. Another 
important element of a border city is their relative large distance from the capital, fact that 
generally affects the financial distribution of resources and the concentration of investors 
and power too far away from them in order to have a positive effect.  This distribution 
generated a relative isolation, but once the globalisation and the progressive opening of 
borders took place, new opportunities arose and new economic and social opportunities 
emerged
15
. In order to develop in a sustainable manner, border cities started to develop 
their own strategies by partnering with different local authorities from across the border so 
that they would transform themselves from “border cities” to “interface cities”16, so that 
the presence of border is no longer seen as a vulnerability in terms of security, but an asset 
that can take the form of different kinds of cooperation from infrastructure to socially, 
culturally based international projects. 
                                                     
13
 Saskia Sassen, “The City: Today’s Frontier Zone,” Glocalism: Journal Of Culture, Politics and 
Innovation (2014): 3. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Antoine Decoville et al., „Opportunities of Cross-border Cooperation between Small and 
Medium Cities in Europe,” Report Written in the Frame of the Spatial Development Observatory, 
on Behalf of the Department of Spatial Planning and Development – Ministry of Sustainable 
Development and Infrastructure in Luxembourg, LISER (2015): 6, accessed August 20, 2015, 
http://www.dat.public.lu/eu-presidency/Events/Workshop-3/Opportunities-of-cross-border-
cooperation-between-small-and-medium-cities-in-Europe-_LISER_.pdf. 
16
 Ibid. 
Next we will analyse the different types of border and frontier cities is order to 
emphasize the differences between them, the issues with which they confront themselves, 
the opportunities that arise, their effect over the national and regional security, etc.  The 
distinction comes as a leitmotiv for the present study, since it offers the geographical / 
cultural / ethnical characteristics of a city. These elements affect in an automatically 
manner the development of that respective city. On one hand we will analyse the frontier 
cities, which often present internal frontiers that separate the city, and on the other we 
make reference to border cities, which have external frontiers that separates not only them 
from other cities, but two separate, independent, sovereign states. Hence, whereas the 
firsts have to look for internal solutions, but the latter must search for external ones in 
order to reach out their goals. 
 
Borders cities 
The European Union presented itself with new important opportunities regarding 
the border cities / regions. The four liberties (persons, capital, goods, and services) 
transformed the closed borders of its member states into an internal free market, which 
enhanced the bilateral and multilateral cooperation, not only between the states, but also 
between the cities. 
The cross border cooperation was regularised through the Outline Convention of 
Madrid from 1980, which provided a legal basis for the agreements between the member 
states.  According to Article 2 of the Convention, “transfrontier co-operation shall mean 
any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between 
territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting 
Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this 
purpose”17. Another legal tool which enforced the importance of cross border cooperation 
is the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation from 2006, which represents the 
„first European cooperation structure with a legal personality defined by European 
Law”18 . From its beginning it was designed to support and promote the cooperation 
between the EU member states at the level of: cross-border, transnational and 
interregional cooperation, with the main objective of fostering the economic and social 
cohesion of the European territory
19
. At the level of implementation, from 2007 till 2014 
there were implemented projects that amount approximately € 60 million20 , fact that 
represents a relative negative dynamic of the initiative, given the large amount of domains 
in which the eligible actors can apply. 
Within the next chapter we will analyse the following situations: cities divided by 
borders; cities which mark a border; cities which mark a border region and enclave cities. 
 
Cities divided by borders 
An example is this case could be the city of Nicosia. The capital of the Republic 
of Cyprus, Nicosia is divided between the North, that is the Turkish Cypriot and the 
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South, which is inhabited by the Greek Cypriots. Whereas the latter is the capital of 
Cyprus and the place where the government is located, the north represents the capital of 
the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, which declared its independency in 1983, but 
it was not recognized internationally. This division, which is enforced by the presence of 
the Turkish army in the north, let to major population dislocations: approximately 175.000 
Greek Cypriots were displaced from the North, while 40.000 Turkish Cypriots from the 
south to the north. The tangible border of the city is represented by the Green Line, which 
was established in 1974 by the UN, and imposes physical crossing of the Greeks to the 
north and for the Turks to the south without special permission. This division tends to 
increase the already present antagonism between the majority (the Greeks) who feel 
threatened by the minority and the geographical neighbourhood with Turkey and the 
minority (the Turks) that feel threatened by the majority. In this way there will emerge a 
situation in which their ethnic identity is augmented by this dichotomy, no one agreeing to 
the de facto separation as an acceptable status quo, leaving no space for actual 
cooperation. The accent on the separation as a possible solution to the ethnic conflict is 
automatically affecting the development of the city, creating major discrepancies between 
the north and the south
21
. 
 
Cities which mark a border 
Giurgiu-Ruse, two cities that once were part of a single city belonging to the 
Bulgarian state, they are now two EU cities that are divided by the Danube. After Giurgiu 
became part of the Romanian state, the interactions between the two went to a much lower 
level. During the communist regime, the interactions increased to a moderated level, since 
there were people which crossed the border for shopping reasons. Neither the fact that in 
2007 the two states became part of the EU changed the status quo
22
. 
The main reasons may be: 
- The lack of infrastructure, the bridge that connects the two cities being under 
construction for years, especially in the Romanian sector. In order to increase the 
interaction level both states wanted to construct a second bridge, but they did not agree on 
its position. On one side, Romania wanted to construct it near Constanta, so that people 
travelling it in their way towards Turkey or Greece should spend more time in Romania. 
On the other side, Bulgaria wanted to construct it near Sofia, for the same reasons
23
.  In 
2010 both states decided to build a bridge between Calafat and Vidin. Although the 
project met with several challenges, which put under question mark its development, it 
became operational and in 2014, especially, during the holiday’s season, the bridge is 
crossed by approximately 7000 cars which travel towards Greece
24
. 
- Immediately after their accession to the EU, we could identify numerous 
Bulgarian companies that tried to enter the Romanian market, the latter being four times 
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the size of Bulgaria’s. But soon the economic crisis erupted and the Romanian economy 
depreciated enough so that they did not find enough opportunities to continue to invest
25
. 
- The prices are relatively the same, so that cross-border shopping is not really 
profitable. Additionally, neither of the two states are part of the Schengen area
26
. 
 
Cities which mark a border region 
„Border regions are areas of contact between territorial systems with various 
political, cultural, economic and institutional heritages”27. As previously mentioned along 
history there were periods in which the borders were relatively impenetrable, fact that 
affected the development of these regions, since the flow of goods, persons, services, 
capital were relatively low. At the same time, being perceived as vulnerable points for the 
security of the state, these regions were not attracting enough investors.  Moreover, as 
aforementioned, the capitals were attracting the highest degree of the GDP, the border 
regions lacking of a suitable degree of national investments. To all these economic and 
military security negative elements, the border regions were confronting with the different 
identities that existed along the border, thus “improving the feeling of the inhabitants to 
belong to a common territory is an important as well as complex task”28. These aspects 
started to change with the development of the European Union, moment in which its 
member states started to trust each other more, given the high level of economic 
integration and exchanges that were brought by the single market. 
An example of border region could be the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion which 
has been created in 2002 by the County Council and the Self-governing Hajdú-Bihar
29
. 
The main objectives of this Euroregion are: „to maintain and develop the relations 
of good neighbourhood; to identify the possible fields for cross-border cooperation; to 
organize and coordinate those activities that promote members’ socially, economically, 
culturally, educationally cooperation, to preserve their health, environment and tourism; to 
implement some precise programmes in the fields of common interest; to promote 
cooperation relations between the inhabitants and the specialists who work in different 
activity fields of common interest; to promote the cooperation of the Euroregion with 
other international organizations; to prepare together some projects in order to obtain 
financial funds from the European Union”30. 
As it can be observed the objects start from the internal level of the region and end 
with the external one. Firstly, it emphasizes the necessity to create a suitable regional 
framework in which the parties find common interests and opportunities in several fields 
in which they can cooperate and only then, it promotes the cooperation between it and 
other regions, proposing a bottom-up approach that starts from the individual level. 
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At the level of implementation, the aforementioned objectives were implemented 
within Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion. In this sense, we can recall the “Cross-border 
values in Bihor-Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion” seminar, event that took place in both Romania 
and Hungary at the same time. The aim of the seminar was to bring together experts from 
both sides of the border so that they would propose recommendations for a deeper 
cooperation and communication levels at regional level
31
. 
Although the cooperation between the cities comprising this border region is 
relatively new and their intensity is thus limited, the potential still exists, especially since, 
for example Oradea and Debrecen
32
, are medium size cities (approximately 200 000 
residents), hence encompass a large number of individuals and that they are relatively 
close to each other (70 km between them). In terms of commuting, the fore mentioned 
numbers translated at the level of 2012, in a number of 6889 persons who passed the 
border from Romania to Hungary in order work and 423 from Hungary to Romania. This 
large difference is explainable by Romania’s lower level of economic development and by 
the fact that a large part of the workers from Romania where belonging to the Hungarian 
minority, for the latter group being much easier to find work since they do not meet the 
language barrier, as in the case of the Hungarians in Romania
33
. This aspect could be dealt 
with if the Hungarians that were coming to Romania to work were going to Harghita or 
Covasna, two counties where the official language of the local administration is both 
Romanian and Hungarian. At the same time the aforementioned counties are ones of the 
poorest from Romania
34
. 
Possible impediments for further cooperation are represented by the facts that: the 
border dividing the two cities is a non-Schengen border, so that the cross-border of goods, 
capital, persons and services are still under EU’s border control procedures; the region’s 
authorities did not develop a territorial development strategy so that they lack a clear 
medium and long term vision. These impediments can be overcome by the fact that within 
Romania, there is a large number of Hungarian Minority which could contribute to the 
future deeper ties between the cities, hence creating common grounds on which they can 
develop future projects. An already implemented cooperation project are the public 
transportation lines that link Oradea to Debrecen, responding to the needs of people that 
cross the border very often or promoting the intensification of such actions
35
. 
 
Enclave cities 
An enclave city could be represented by Kaliningrad, a city which was considered 
a German territory for approximately 700 years, until 1945 when is became part of the 
Soviet Union. At the level of population, as a traditional strategy, the Soviet authorities 
decided to deport the German residents. Thus, Kaliningrad was to be inhabited by a mix 
composed of Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians. Soon the German architecture was 
destroyed and replaced by the Soviet style one and the city witnessed a military 
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isolation
36
. Nowadays this city is surrounded by two EU member states, Poland and 
Lithuania, hence it is on one hand isolated from the Russian mainland while on the other 
its residents need visa in order to enter the Polish and Lithuanian territories, even if their 
final destination is Russia. 
Being ruptured from the Russian mainland, Kaliningrad is liable to enter in an 
economic isolation, since it also lacks the possibility to develop administrative 
independent bodies that will establish the necessary and stable policies and institutions, 
elements that are quintessential for foreign investors’ attraction. Legally, „the Russian 
constitution does not precisely define the rights of the 89 federal regions to pursue 
independent economic and political ties with other nations. Article 72, paragraph 2, of the 
Russian constitution notes that all subjects of the Russian Federation (respubliki, krai, 
oblasti, okrygi) have equal rights in the sphere of international ties (mezhdunarodnyie 
svyazi) and the formation of external economic ties (vneshne-ekonomicheskie svyazi)”37. 
But these elements do not precisely explain what international ties imply and to what 
degree the economic ties can develop. Do international ties imply diplomatic 
representation abroad? Are the economic ties restricted to trade agreements?
38
 
All this indecisiveness at the legal level coupled with the conflict regarding the 
free trade zone reinstatement and the internal debate from the Russian Federation 
regarding the role of the centre and the role of the periphery augment the vulnerable 
position of the city affecting not only its development, but also its identify
39
. 
 
Frontier cities 
Where in the case of border-states, we could actually identify the demarcation line, 
in the case of frontier cities they are often invisible lines that still create the same or even a 
deeper separation between certain identities / groups / persons. Regarding this aspects we 
will analyse the following types of frontier cities: cities that present frontiers between 
communities, cities with integrated cultural frontiers and cities with social frontiers. 
 
Cities with frontiers between communities 
Earlier we have analysed the internal dynamics of a city which is divided by 
borders, Nicosia. In that example the city was split by visible, tangible lines that governed 
the passing of citizens from the north to the south. In the case of cities that present frontiers 
between various communities, the separating lines are not tangible or regularised. Rather 
than that, they are invisible, but possible having a deeper effect of separation than in the first 
case. An example in this sense could be the city of Sarajevo. Between 1992 and 1996, the 
tensions between the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian Militias resulted in ten thousands of 
deaths and the destruction of almost 60% of the city’s buildings. The political solution came 
with the Dayton accord which officially institutionalised the de facto partition of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Presently, Sarajevo “is […] a different city, moving from a mixed ethnic 
population of 540,000 Bosnian Muslims (40%), Bosnian Serbs (30%) and Bosnian Croats 
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(20%) in 1991 to an approximately 80% Muslim city today of about 340,000 population”40, 
hence creating the unseen limits of the city in which NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) 
are present, trying to ensure the peace, security and stability in the absence of a marked 
border. Where in the case of Nicosia the actual border was seen as a potential solution to the 
conflict between the two antagonist parties, in the case of Sarajevo their absence are seen as 
a possible way of integrating all groups into a single city that will be able to develop a 
sustainable economic and social system. In this context the main responsibility lays in the 
hands of politicians who can construct on long term a unique, multicultural environment that 
will ensure the future development of the city. 
 
Cities with integrated cultural frontiers 
Where regarding the aforementioned cases, Nicosia and Sarajevo, we identified 
divided cities by visible and invisible limits, in the case of integrated cultural frontiers, 
cities have succeeded in transforming a diverse cultural society into a multicultural one. 
One example in this case can be the Romanian city of Timişoara. 
Almost 3.000 non-EU migrants were facing with a rigid and unapproachable 
administrative system. Being aware of the vulnerabilities that can arose from a culturally 
different environment, the local authorities implemented a project called Migrant in 
Intercultural Romania (MiIR). The project’s activities were implemented with the aim of 
reaching a trilateral sustained dialogue between: local authorities that had the solve the 
local issues by using local resources, national thematic meetings having the aim of 
adapting the legal system and coming with viable solutions and last, but not least, 
intercultural mediators that facilitated the communication and the cooperation between all 
parties. “The MiIR project recorded significant successes in terms of consultation and 
practical local interventions. Local representatives of the ministries and governments, like 
the prefecture, local immigration offices or country education inspectors, have managed to 
implement measures that were deemed necessary during local consultations”41. Although 
the city of Timişoara could have stood as an example for other cases in Romania, the 
changes that occurred at national level were relatively slow. The project proved to be 
successful due to the right identification of all relevant local and national actors that had 
the competences and the power to change the undesired status-quo. Additionally the 
political will for this change to happen was present in the case of Timişoara, factor which 
is quintessential for the positive end of the project and its sustainability. At the same time, 
this element was not met yet neither in the case of Nicosia, nor in the case of Sarajevo. 
 
Cities with social frontiers 
At the same time the ethnicity or the religion are not the only differencing factors 
that can create intangible limits within cities. The existence of “the other” is more visible 
than ever given the current migrants from Syria with which the EU is confronting. On one 
hand, it represents an organisation that fights against human rights’ breach and in this 
sense it became an active player in the Middle East. On the other hand, it can still be 
perceived as a fortress, which raises its borders as part of a securitisation behavioural 
pattern, fact that contradicts with its normative power character. In a situation of crisis like 
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the current migrants one, some European cities will confront with large numbers of 
refugees that will have to have to have subsistence resources, shelter, etc. Also they have 
different identities, other cultural backgrounds aspect that would generate a feeling of 
separation between the current residents and them. If maintained, this differentiation can 
generate the city’s fragmentation. Therefore, on medium and long term they will have to 
become an integrated part of the city in order to maintain a unitary or multicultural 
identity of the city and to not transform the city into a frontier one. 
At the same time the economic development of certain groups is also a defining 
element that can create frontiers within a city, by the development of poor and rich 
districts. The economic disparities tend to be viewed as natural consequences. Once the 
industrialisation process has started and activities changed from agricultural based to 
industrialised ones, the population became more and more urban and inequalities tend to 
exist until the income ruses to a level where all members of that specific society reach a 
common standard living. This logic could be applied also to large cities. As they grow 
larger and larger, they encompass a larger population and the economic disparities tend to 
be more visible, than in the case of small cities
42
. 
Many EU and non-EU cities have been divided by the invisible economic 
development, where the south is poor and feels socially excluded and the north that is rich 
and it is perceived as the majority which influences the policy. This case can also apply to 
the current migrants’ crisis. Many of the refugees are people with low income that are 
leaving their countries from security reasons. In this context, receiving large numbers of 
refugees will affect the economic development of the city and of the state. 
 
Conclusions 
Regardless of the current international development and the globalisation’s effect, 
we still face physical and symbolic borders / frontiers. The development of economic free 
trade areas facilitated the lift of tangible border controls, but at simultaneously it led to the 
emergence of different kinds of frontiers. 
Last, but not least, we must not forget that the EU’s borders have been under 
constant change. Thus, the enlargement process could have been viewed as major 
opportunity for border cities that faced important chances regarding the market access. For 
example, when Romania became an EU member state, cities that are very close to the 
border, like Oradea had greater opportunities than for cities that are further away from the 
border like Craiova. Once the lines shift, border cities tend to increase their attractiveness 
for investors as analysed above. But at the same time, the border is still viewed as a 
burden
43
 especially when that respective city is at the external border and the regional 
dynamics are affecting the security level in a negative way. Regarding this last aspect, 
Suceava felt the negative effects of the Ukrainian crisis, given their geographical 
neighbourhood with border cities like Cernăuţi (aprox. 84 km). Another aspect is related 
to the effects of the border, which are relatively limited, around 70km. Moreover, the 
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studies show that the effect, where is present, does not last in long term, being about 
maximum 30 years
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